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chapter 12
Deep-Sea Bottom Fisheries and the Protection 
of Seabed Ecosystems: Problems, Progress 
and Prospects
Richard Caddell
1 Introduction
Of the myriad industrial activities currently undertaken in the marine envi-
ronment, fisheries have progressively emerged as ‘the most widespread source 
of anthropogenic physical disturbance to global seabed habitats’.1 Demersal 
fisheries (i.e., those targeting benthic and benthopelagic species, whose core 
habitats comprise the seabed or areas in very close proximity to it) have been 
conducted for centuries and are of enduring commercial and nutritional 
importance to many States. However, as with numerous other fishing practices, 
technological advances have dramatically transformed demersal fisheries over 
the past half-century.2 While seabed fisheries were historically concentrated in 
coastal and inshore locations, the steady depletion of shallow-water stocks has 
subsequently forced many fishers to pursue offshore and deep-sea alternatives.3 
Consequently, the mean depth of global fisheries has expanded four-fold since 
the mid-1960s,4 as industrial fleets have increasingly targeted new deep-water 
opportunities, notably those located within areas beyond national jurisdiction 
(ABNJ). Although fishing is by no means a new use of the seabed, the poorly 
regulated proliferation of fisheries into unprecedented depths has neverthe-
less generated novel environmental and management concerns, with worrying 
implications for the enduring health and integrity of benthic ecosystems.
1   J.G. Hiddink et al., ‘Global Analysis of Depletion and Recovery of Seabed Biota After Bottom 
Trawling Disturbance’ (2017) 114 PNAS 8301, 8301. Even in regions noted for an extensive off-
shore industrial presence, the impact of fisheries on seabed ecosystems often outweighs that 
of all other anthropogenic activities combined: A.R. Benn et al., ‘Human Activities on the 
Deep Seafloor in the North East Atlantic: An Assessment of Spatial Extent’ (2010) 5 PLoS One 
e12730.
2   W. Swartz et al., ‘The Spatial Expansion and Ecological Footprint of Fisheries (1950 to 
Present)’ (2010) 5 PLoS One e15143.
3   T. Morato et al., ‘Fishing Down The Deep’ (2006) 7 Fish and Fisheries 24, 31.
4   E.A. Norse et al., ‘Sustainability of Deep-Sea Fisheries’ (2012) 36 Marine Policy, 307, 308.
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Demersal fisheries deploy an array of gear to catch their respective target 
species, all of which involve at least some contact with the seabed, thereby 
posing varying degrees of collateral risk to the benthic environment.5 Some 
equipment – such as traps and pots – ultimately exert a superficial impact upon 
marine ecosystems.6 Others – notably gillnets and longlines – inflict little phys-
ical damage to the seabed itself, but have provoked rather different regulatory 
anxieties due to their propensity for incidental catches of non-target species, 
particularly marine mammals.7 Instead, bottom fisheries8 – especially those 
engaged in bottom trawling,9 involving the dragging of weighted nets over the 
seabed – are by some distance the most ecologically injurious forms of demer-
sal fishing. They also remain among the most prevalent, with approximately 
20–25% of all current global seafood landings attributed to bottom trawling.10
The advent of bottom trawling can be traced back to the late fourteenth 
century,11 although historical objections to its impacts were often confined to 
overfishing and the displacement of small-scale fishers by industrial fleets.12 
Nevertheless, even by the 1860s, regular complaints were raised over the 
‘scouring’ of the seabed by trawl nets.13 More recent ecological vexations over 
bottom trawling have concerned the scraping of vulnerable benthic sediments,14 
5    M.J. Kaiser et al., ‘Prioritization of Knowledge-Needs to Achieve Best Practices for Bottom 
Trawling in Relation to Seabed Habitats’ (2016) 17 Fish and Fisheries 637, 639.
6    F. Stephenson et al., ‘Experimental Potting Impacts on Common UK Reef Habitats 
in Areas of High and Low Fishing Pressure’ (2017) 74 ICES Journal of Marine Science 
1648, 1657.
7    A.J. Reid, ‘The Looming Crisis: Interactions between Marine Mammals and Fisheries’ 
(2008) 89 Journal of Mammalogy 541, 542–543.
8    Bottom fisheries are defined by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as any 
fishery that uses gear ‘that either contact or are likely to contact the sea floor during the 
course of the fishing operation’: A. Bensch et al., Worldwide Review of Bottom Fisheries in 
the High Seas (FAO: Rome, 2009), 2.
9    Bottom trawling is an umbrella term for the use of a variety of gear, each of which uses 
variations that encapsulate weighted features with the capacity to impact both hard- and 
soft-bottom benthic ecosystems: see further J.W. Valdermansen, T. Jørgensen and A. Engås, 
Options to Mitigate Bottom Habitat Impact of Dragged Gears (FAO: Rome, 2007), 5–18.
10   Hiddink (n.1), 8301 (extrapolating global catch data collated by the FAO since 2009).
11   C. Roberts, The Unnatural History of the Sea (Island Press: Washington DC, 2007), 131–2.
12   T.K. Kerby, W.W.L. Cheung and G.H. Engelhard, ‘The United Kingdom’s Role in North Sea 
Demersal Fisheries: A Hundred Year Perspective’ (2012) 22 Reviews in Fish Biology and 
Fisheries 621, 629.
13   R.H. Thurstan, J.P. Hawkins and C.M. Roberts, ‘Origins of the Bottom Trawling Controversy 
in the British Isles: 19th Century Witness Testimonies Reveal Evidence of Early Fishery 
Declines’ (2014) 15 Fish and Fisheries 506, 515.
14   F.G. O’Neill and A. Ivanović, ‘The Physical Impact of Towed Demersal Fishing Gears on 
Soft Sediments’ (2016) 73(Supplement) ICES Journal of Marine Science 5, 12.
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damage to submarine features,15 the removal of habitat-forming species16 and 
the disturbance of complex benthic ecosystems which may in turn further 
compromise fish productivity.17 Moreover, while bottom trawling may inflict 
specific localised impacts upon the seabed, these fisheries also represent a sig-
nificant contribution to the cumulative footprint of anthropogenic activities 
in the global oceans, hence their effects may be exacerbated in tandem with 
those of other industries.18 Seabed ecosystems are slow to recover from such 
impacts: although data are currently limited, full regeneration appears likely to 
be a multi-decadal process and one fraught with scientific uncertainty.19
The prospective impact of bottom trawling is amplified in the case of 
deep-sea fisheries. In order to facilitate fishing at advanced depths, larger and 
heavier equipment is required to ensure the effective operation of the trawl, 
hence these activities are often significantly more destructive to the seabed 
than trawling undertaken in shallower waters.20 Likewise, trawling is often 
conducted repeatedly and intensively in particular locations, notably in the 
vicinity of seamounts and other fragile submarine features due to habit-
ual aggregation of fish in many such areas,21 thereby representing a serious 
threat to the integrity of seabed ecosystems.22 Such fisheries also pose con-
siderable risks to long-term sustainability of their target species. Indeed, 
in order to survive at advanced depths, in an environment characterised by 
cold temperatures, little light and limited productivity, deep-sea fish typically 
15   M.R. Clark et al., ‘The Impacts of Deep-Sea Fisheries on Benthic Communities: A Review’ 
(2016) 73(Supplement) ICES Journal of Marine Science 51, 52.
16   S.F. Thrush, K.E. Ellingsen and K. Davis, ‘Implications of Fisheries Impacts to Seabed 
Biodiversity and Ecosystem-Based Management’ (2016) 73(Supplement) ICES Journal of 
Marine Science 44, 45.
17   J. Collie et al., ‘Indirect Effects of Bottom Fishing on the Productivity of Marine Fish’ (2017) 
18 Fish and Fisheries 619, 634.
18   Thrush (n.16), 45–46. Nor are benthic ecosystems the only fragile features at risk – 
concerns have also been raised over the impacts of trawling upon underwater cultural 
heritage: M.L. Brennan et al., ‘Quantification of Bottom Trawl Fishing Damage to Ancient 
Shipwreck Sites’ (2016) 371 Marine Geology 82.
19   M.R. Clark et al., ‘Little Evidence of Benthic Community Resilience to Bottom Trawling on 
Seamounts After 15 Years’ (2019) 6 Frontiers in Marine Science 1, 13.
20   Clark (n.15), 52.
21   Although a definitive accounting remains elusive for all fish species for which seamounts 
form an essential habitat, current projections indicate that approximately 800 sepa-
rate species of fish may be considered seamount species, while a considerable array of 
additional species aggregate around such features at some stage during their life cycles: 
T. Morato, W.W.L. Cheung and T.J. Pitcher, ‘Vulnerability of Seamount Fish to Fishing: 
Fuzzy Analysis of Life History Attributes’ (2006) 68 Journal of Fish Biology 209.
22   A. Pusceddu et al., ‘Chronic and Intensive Bottom Trawling Impairs Deep-Sea Biodiversity 
and Ecosystem Functioning’ (2014) 111 PNAS 8861, 8861.
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exhibit delayed sexual maturity, slow growth and a high maximum age, hence 
stocks may become rapidly depleted with little scope to regenerate swiftly.23 
Compounding these concerns, catches from deep-sea trawling provide a neg-
ligible contribution to current nutritional needs, accounting for less than 0.5% 
of global landings,24 while causing significant long-term damage to the seabed 
in the process. Moreover, deep-sea fishing in ABNJ is conducted by relatively 
few national fleets, thereby inflicting a strikingly disproportionate degree of 
harm upon the global commons relative to its numerical participants.
Despite these concerns, until the turn of the present century, many bottom 
fisheries were subject to surprisingly minimal regulation, as regional fisher-
ies management organisations (RFMOs) either lacked an express mandate to 
address benthic ecosystems or had yet to be established in respect of signifi-
cant portions of the global oceans, while little provision had been made for 
seabed fishing within the overarching legal framework provided by the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982.25 This has since been addressed 
through the graduated development of a distinct tier of regulation for seabed 
ecosystems, which has emerged largely ab initio over the course of the past two 
decades. The contemporary oversight of deep-sea bottom fisheries accordingly 
represents an intriguing case-study of the development of regulatory standards 
concerning the seabed. In this regard, regulatory momentum has been primar-
ily channelled through the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which 
has adopted a series of highly influential Resolutions calling for the protection 
of vulnerable marine ecosystems (VMEs) on the seabed. The political impetus 
provided by multiple UNGA Resolutions has in turn prompted the adoption 
of complementary conservation and management measures by RFMOs, flag 
states and other pertinent actors. As this Chapter will demonstrate, consid-
erable progress has since been made towards the development of uniform 
standards for bottom fishing, although the implementation of this framework 
remains far from complete. Such shortcomings will accordingly need to be fur-
ther addressed in order to operationalise the commitments established under 
this collective of UNGA Resolutions, and thus to fully protect benthic ecosys-
tems from the adverse impacts of fishing activities.
To this end, this Chapter first outlines the emergence of global standards 
towards the protection of VMEs, examining the limits of global instruments 
and tracing the development of the pertinent UNGA commitments (Section 2). 
23   Norse (n.4), 317.
24   L. Victorero et al., ‘Out of Sight, but Within Reach: A Global History of Bottom-Trawled 
Deep-Sea Fisheries from >400m Depth’ (2018) 5 Frontiers in Marine Ecology 1, 4.
25   1883 UNTS 396 [hereinafter ‘LOSC’].
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The Chapter then examines the extent to which these commitments have been 
implemented by RFMOs and other pertinent actors (Section 3), before advanc-
ing a series of conclusions as to the future regulatory landscape concerning 
bottom fisheries (Section 4).
2 The Legal Framework for the Regulation of Deep-Sea 
Bottom Fisheries
2.1 Fisheries, the Seabed and the Limitations of the LOSC
Until the early twenty-first century, deep-sea bottom fisheries were largely 
overlooked by international law. Even as deep-sea trawling began to expand 
on an unprecedented scale from the mid-1970s, such practices remained 
largely inured from regulatory scrutiny as the ‘out of sight, out of mind’ nature 
of bottom fishing in remote locations ensured that there was little popular 
appreciation of its deleterious impacts upon the seabed. Instead, multilateral 
fisheries regulation continued to focus primarily on the management of staple 
pelagic stocks, such as salmon or tuna. This is perhaps unsurprising, since deep-
sea fish have not traditionally constituted an attractive cohort of target species, 
either physically or economically. However, by the 1980s a number of deep-
sea species had undergone something of a gastronomic renaissance. Having 
initially been taken – and often discarded – as undesirable by-catch, promi-
nent seafood chefs began to appreciate that their versatile flavour and texture 
allowed for considerable culinary creativity.26 This subsequently created an 
unprecedented demand for particular fish that had rarely been pursued – or 
regulated – as a target stock. Coupled with the tactical rebranding of many 
species to render their previous sobriquets rather more palatable to discern-
ing diners – for instance, ‘slimehead’ and ‘toothfish’ have been rechristened 
as ‘orange roughy’ and ‘Chilean seabass’ respectively27 – distant water deep-
sea fishing was swiftly transformed into a highly lucrative undertaking. At the 
same time, however, this unexpectedly elevated demand starkly exposed acute 
governance gaps in the international framework for the regulation of fisheries 
and seabed ecosystems.28
26   G.B. Knecht, Hooked: A True Story of Pirates, Poaching and the Perfect Fish (Allen & Unwin: 
Sydney, 2006), 81–86.
27   For a sobering account of the extent of this practice see J.L. Jacquet and D. Pauly, ‘Trade 
Secrets: Renaming and Mislabeling of Seafood’ (2008) 32 Marine Policy 309, 311–313.
28   K.M. Gjerde and D. Freestone, ‘Unfinished Business: Deep-Sea Fisheries and the 
Conservation of Marine Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2004) 19 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 209, 209.
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A ‘perfect storm’ of three regulatory lacunae can be seen to have engen-
dered a rapacious frontier mentality towards deep-sea demersal fish. Firstly, 
RFMOs had yet to be established for substantial geographical portions of the 
global oceans, meaning that there were few pre-existing governance structures 
through which such fisheries could be regulated. Secondly, of the compara-
tively small number of RFMOs that were in existence at the material time, most 
had been established to regulate a single species and had no express compe-
tence over deep-sea stocks. And thirdly, of the four regulators that in principle 
held a mandate over deep-sea fish,29 these powers were seemingly limited to 
setting stock allocations rather than addressing the wider ecosystem impacts 
of bottom fisheries. Although (as considered further below) these bodies have 
tended to interpret their powers proactively in order to advance protective 
measures for deep-sea ecosystems, arguably only CCAMLR possessed undis-
puted competence over both the stocks and their surrounding environment.30 
This effective regulatory vacuum duly facilitated a ‘gold rush’ among certain 
fleets, which invested heavily in new technology in order to exploit seabed fish-
eries resources before meaningful management actions could be elaborated.31 
Consequently, by the late 1990s leading estimates suggested that an area of up 
to half the size of the global continental shelf was being trawled annually,32 
facilitated by a dearth of regulation that ensured that ‘people trawl almost any-
where they want, and the sea’s equivalents of ancient forests are becoming 
cattle pastures by default, not by design’.33
Little overt guidance towards the responsible pursuit of demersal fisheries 
was forthcoming from the LOSC. The LOSC elaborates a broad framework for 
fisheries competences, under which states may utilise fisheries resources on 
the high seas34 and in their respective exclusive economic zones (EEZs),35 sub-
ject to obligations concerning the conservation and management of the stocks 
29   Namely the North-East Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC), the Northwest Atlantic 
Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean 
(GFCM) and the Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR).
30   E.J. Molenaar, ‘Addressing Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries’ (2005) 20 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 533, 538.
31   A. Merrie et al., ‘An Ocean of Surprises – Trends in Human Use, Unexpected Dynamics 
and Governance Challenges in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’ (2014) 27 Global 
Environmental Change 19, 26.
32   L. Wattling and E.A. Norse, ‘Disturbance of the Seabed by Mobile Fishing Gear: A 
Comparison to Forest Clearcutting’ (1998) 12 Conservation Biology 1180, 1180.
33   Ibid., 1193.
34   Articles 87(1)(a) and 116.
35   Article 62.
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in question.36 Nevertheless, these provisions of the Convention merely estab-
lish generalised requirements for the conduct of fisheries: within the EEZ, 
stocks must be managed in a way that consistently allows for harvest at maxi-
mum sustainable yield and that overfishing does not occur as a result, while 
also taking into consideration the inter-dependence of fish stocks,37 with high 
seas fishing conducted subject to the more ambiguous obligation to exercise 
‘due regard’ towards the interests of others.38
Nor were demersal fisheries considered in Part VI of the LOSC, which 
addresses the continental shelf. Indeed, proposals to specifically regulate ben-
thic and benthopelagic species within the ambit of these provisions – given 
that they are ‘intimately associated with the seabed’ – were expressly rejected 
during the negotiation of the Convention.39 Instead, fisheries entitlements on 
the continental shelf under the LOSC are restricted to the exercise of sovereign 
rights over sedentary species.40 Such species are defined as ‘organisms which, 
at the harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or are 
unable to move except in constant physical contact with the seabed or the 
subsoil’.41 This has created sporadic controversy over the status of particular 
stocks of crustaceans and molluscs, whose biological attributes and behav-
iour do not always neatly align with the legal understanding of a ‘sedentary’ 
species, while also raising questions over the limits of RFMO competences 
towards certain seabed species.42 In any event, the demersal fish targeted by 
trawling clearly do not meet the Article 77 criteria and thereby lie outside the 
ambit of Part VI. Such fisheries instead remain subject to the general position 
36   Articles 61 (EEZ) and 117–119 (high seas).
37   Article 61.
38   Article 87(2).
39   S. Borg, Conservation on the High Seas: Harmonizing International Regimes for the 
Sustainable Use of Marine Resources (Edward Elgar: Cheltenham: 2012) 151.
40   Article 77(1).
41   Article 77(4).
42   As recently considered by the Norwegian courts where, in two separate prosecutions 
against Latvian-flagged crabbing vessels, Norway has sought to enforce its sovereign rights 
over snow crabs as a lucrative sedentary species: see further I. Dahl and E. Johansen, The 
Norwegian Snow Crab Regime and Foreign Vessels – A Commentary on the Juras Vilkas Decision 
of the Øst-Finnmark District Court; available on-line at http://site.uit.no/jclos/2017/03/29/
the -norwegian- snow- crab -regime -and-foreign-vessels -a- commentary- on 
-the-juras-vilkas-decision-of-the-ost-finnmark-district-court/ and T. Henriksen, The 
Senator Case – A New Turn in Norway’s Dealings with Foreign Vessels Operating in 
the Waters off Svalbard, available on-line at https://site.uit.no/jclos/2019/02/28/the-senator 
-case-a-new-turn-in-norways-dealings-with-foreign-vessels-operating-in-the-waters-off 
-svalbard/.
Richard Caddell - 9789004391567
Downloaded from Brill.com02/05/2020 07:10:47PM
via free access
262 Caddell
prescribed in relation to the EEZ, since ‘[t]he rights of the coastal State over 
the continental shelf do not affect the legal status of the superjacent waters’.43
Similarly, the LOSC made no direct provision for the regulation of fishing in 
those areas of the seabed that lie outside the confines of national jurisdiction 
(the ‘Area’). The provisions of Part XI, which pertain to the Area, clarify that the 
concept of ‘resources’ in this context is restricted to minerals.44 As with the con-
tinental shelf regime, trawl fishing in the Area is thus subject to the provisions 
governing the high seas.45
A more intriguing position arises where the coastal state has exercised 
its right under Article 76 of the LOSC to extend its continental shelf beyond 
the orthodox 200 nautical mile limit. This may lead to conflicts between the 
interests of the coastal state in protecting the seabed environment in this 
area – either for its own intrinsic value or to safeguard a lucrative aggregation 
of sedentary species – and those of another state intending to undertake bot-
tom trawling by exercising its long-established rights to fish on the high seas, 
as guaranteed under Article 87(2). A coastal state cannot unilaterally impose a 
blanket ban on trawling across the entirety of its outer continental shelf, since 
Article 78(2) specifies that ‘[t]he exercise of the rights of the coastal State over 
the continental shelf must not infringe or result in any unjustifiable interfer-
ence with navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided 
for in this Convention’. Instead, this raises the possibility that more localised 
restrictions could represent a justifiable interference with the exercise of high 
seas freedoms. Indeed, a sense of coexistence between states has long been 
considered necessary where there are bifurcated entitlements applicable to 
overlapping areas of maritime jurisdiction: as confirmed by the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the Bangladesh/Myanmar case, 
‘the legal regime of the continental shelf has always coexisted with another 
legal regime in the same area … each coastal State must exercise its rights and 
perform its duties with due regard to the rights and duties of the other’.46 By 
analogy to practice in other industries, Mossop suggests that a coastal state 
could prospectively introduce limited restrictions on bottom trawling in these 
43   Article 78(1).
44   Article 133.
45   Article 135.
46   Dispute concerning delimitation of the maritime boundary between Bangladesh and 
Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh/Myanmar); Judgment of 14 March 2012: 
para 475.
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areas, provided that interference with legitimate high seas freedoms is mini-
mal and appropriate consultations have been undertaken.47
Nevertheless, given the limited ability of the coastal state to control activi-
ties in the superjacent water column of the high seas, such restrictions are 
likely to be markedly strengthened where they operate in tandem with those of 
a multilateral body, such as an RFMO or a Regional Seas Organisation (RSO) – 
and are arguably weakened where such collaboration is not forthcoming. For 
instance, an RSO may implement a marine protected area (MPA) or an RFMO 
may establish concurrent restrictions on fishing in areas of the high seas that 
overlay locations of the outer continental shelf for which a coastal state has 
sought to curtail bottom fisheries. As noted below, given that ABNJ are pri-
marily regulated on a sectoral basis, the optimal solution for seabed locations 
of particular ecological sensitivity would be for each of these designations to 
operate in tandem. In a limited number of cases, such designations have been 
successfully aligned: most notably in the context of the Altair and Antialtair 
Seamounts located on the outer continental shelf of Portugal, which have been 
protected from trawling by the Portuguese authorities, with parallel fishing 
restrictions imposed in the superjacent water column by the pertinent RFMO, 
NEAFC, alongside an overlapping MPA designation under the Convention for 
the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North East Atlantic,48 which 
has thus secured the highest possible degree of protection for these features.49 
This is not the case for all such features purportedly protected by states on their 
outer continental shelves, however, as other Portuguese designations attest.50
This is not to suggest that delicate seabed features are devoid of legal protec-
tion under the LOSC. Indeed, benthic ecosystems are more directly regulated 
under Part XII of the LOSC, addressing the protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, with Articles 192 and 194 of particular relevance. Both 
provisions have been subject to extensive judicial consideration in recent years 
to clarify their application and scope. Article 192 rather concisely provides 
that ‘[s]tates have the obligation to protect and preserve the marine environ-
ment’. In a fisheries context it has been recently acknowledged that Article 192 
‘extends to the prevention of harms that would affect depleted, threatened, or 
47   J. Mossop, The Continental Shelf Beyond 200 Nautical Miles: Rights and Responsibilities 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2016), 195.
48   2354 UNTS 67 [hereinafter ‘OSPAR Convention’].
49   See further Mossop (n.47), 218–220.
50   Ibid., 220.
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endangered species indirectly through the destruction of their habitat’,51 which 
not only provides a basis to protect seabed ecosystems, but also imposes an 
obligation of due diligence upon flag states to ensure that nationally-registered 
vessels adhere to relevant conservation and management measures in the con-
duct of fishing activities.52
Similarly, Article 194(5) provides that measures undertaken pursuant to 
Part XII of the LOSC ‘shall include those necessary to protect and preserve 
rare or fragile ecosystems as well as the habitat of depleted, threatened or 
endangered species and other forms of marine life’. In the South China Sea 
Arbitration, it was considered that the general obligation to protect the marine 
environment advanced in Article 192 is ‘given particular shape in the context 
of fragile ecosystems by Article 194(5)’.53 Although this did not concern bot-
tom fishing per se, the Tribunal nonetheless declared that if a state is deemed 
to have knowledge that its vessels are conducting destructive fishing activities, 
a failure to enforce such measures may constitute a breach of the obligation 
of due diligence.54 Like Article 192, recent jurisprudence has clarified that 
Article 194 is also to be viewed expansively, and is ‘not limited to measures 
aimed strictly at controlling pollution and extends to measures focussed 
primarily on conservation and the preservation of ecosystems’.55 As with 
Article 78(2), when exercising the obligations prescribed under Article 194, 
states ‘shall refrain from unjustifiable interference with activities carried out 
by other States in the exercise of their rights and in pursuance of their duties in 
conformity with this Convention’.56 The concept of unjustifiable interference 
has been recently considered to be ‘functionally equivalent’ to the obligations 
to give ‘due regard’ under Article 56(2) and of good faith under Article 2(3) of 
the LOSC.57 The extent of the obligation under Article 194(4) remains essen-
tially context-dependant, although the Arbitral Panel considered that due 
regard as applied under Article 56(2) will depend upon the nature of the rights 
held, their importance, the extent of the anticipated impairment, the nature 
and importance of the activities and the availability of alternative approaches 
51   South China Sea Arbitration (Republic of the Philippines v. Peoples’ Republic of China), 
Award of 12 July 2016; para 959.
52   Request for an Advisory Opinion Submitted by the Sub-Regional Fisheries Commission 
(SRFC); paras 118–140.
53   South China Sea Arbitration (n.51), para 959.
54   Ibid., paras 964–966.
55   Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v. UK ), Award of 18 March 2015; para 
538.
56   Article 194(4).
57   Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (n.55), para 540.
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and will involve ‘at least some consultation’.58 Provided this broad balancing 
act is undertaken, the possibility for the legitimate interference with fishing 
rights otherwise guaranteed under the LOSC was pointedly left open in the 
Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, although this would require ‘signifi-
cant engagement … to explain the need for the measure and to explore less 
restrictive alternatives’. Accordingly, Article 194 provides a prospective basis 
for restricting bottom fishing in areas of known sensitivity, albeit based on 
meaningful consultations and with the possibility that intended activities 
may still proceed to a lesser extent in the intended location or be displaced to 
another area of the seabed.
2.2 The Evolving UNGA Commitments and the Emergence of the VME 
Concept
Notwithstanding the ongoing elaboration of obligations under Part XII of the 
LOSC, the protection of benthic ecosystems from the damaging impacts of bot-
tom fisheries has been primarily driven by a series of key UNGA Resolutions 
adopted over the course of the past fifteen years, which have subsequently 
proved influential in the adoption of unified standards and policies by RFMOs, 
flag states and other actors. By the late 1990s, concerns began to mount over the 
proliferation of bottom fisheries and the effective lack of regulation for many 
demersal species. In some cases, regulation was largely localised and bilateral, 
as exemplified by the pioneering arrangement between Australia and New 
Zealand to set allocations for orange roughy in the South Tasman rise.59 While 
such arrangements were predominantly focused on catch limits, allocations 
and stock analysis, they also introduced localised prohibitions on trawling and 
demersal fishing in particular locations, albeit that bottom fishing could still 
proceed with the express authorisation of the parties.60 Such initiatives were 
however few and far between, leading to increased calls for a more globalised 
tier of regulation over deep-sea bottom fisheries.
58   Ibid., para 518.
59   See further E.J. Molenaar, ‘The South Tasman Rise Arrangement and Other Initiatives 
on Management and Conservation of Orange Roughy’ (2001) 16 International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law 77. As Molenaar observes, a series of orange roughy fisheries in 
the Southern Hemisphere provided a strong test for international fisheries regulation 
in the interim period between the adoption and entry into force of the UN Fish Stocks 
Agreement.
60   Arrangement Between the Government of Australia and the Government of New Zealand 
for the Conservation and Management of Orange Roughy on the South Tasman Rise 2000; 
reproduced in Molenaar, ibid.
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Despite an emerging degree of support for the improved governance of 
demersal fisheries, there were strong divergences of opinion over which insti-
tution would be best placed to institute effective regulation and whether these 
activities were best addressed through binding or non-binding means.61 In 
this respect, the UNGA offers particular advantages in providing both a suit-
ably global platform for such discussions, while also avoiding the more loaded 
issue of whether such standards should be legally binding and thereby trigger 
substantive consequences if they are not fully implemented. Although UNGA 
Resolutions are not technically binding,62 in recent years they have never-
theless had considerable traction as a regulatory spur to address destructive 
fishing practices.63 This proved to be particularly true in the context of large-
scale driftnet fishing on the high seas, with a series of UNGA Resolutions in 
the early 1990s providing a compelling stimulus for specific regulatory activity 
by RFMOs and other actors,64 to the extent to which commentators have sug-
gested that these standards now represent customary international law.65
The UNGA driftnet Resolutions provided a helpful regulatory template to 
promote policies to address the impacts of bottom fishing on seabed ecosys-
tems. In 2002, the UNGA recognised for the first time the need to consider ‘the 
management of risks to marine biodiversity of seamounts and certain other 
underwater features’.66 This precipitated a protracted and circular series of 
discussions within a variety of different multilateral bodies as to the most 
61   See D.A. Balton and D.C. Zbicz, ‘Managing Deep-Sea Fisheries: Some Threshold Questions’ 
(2004) 19 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 247, 252–255.
62   As Harrison observes, UNGA Resolutions are not law-making tools but have had a more 
nuanced influence on state practice as ‘a means of drawing attention to the current 
threats to fish stocks and encouraging international efforts taking place in other institu-
tions to address them’: J. Harrison, Making the Law of the Sea: A Study in the Development 
of International Law (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2013), 204.
63   See further R. Caddell, ‘International Fisheries Law and Interactions with Global Regimes 
and Processes’ in R. Caddell and E.J. Molenaar, Strengthening International Fisheries Law 
in an Era of Changing Oceans (Hart: Oxford, 2019) 133, 135–137.
64   On the elaboration of these provisions see D.R. Rothwell, ‘The General Assembly Ban on 
Driftnet Fishing’ in D. Shelton (ed.) Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding 
Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2003), 121,126–
131, W.T. Burke, M. Freeberg and E.L. Miles, ‘United Nations Resolutions on Driftnet 
Fishing: An Unsustainable Precedent for High Seas and Coastal Fisheries Management’ 
(1994) 25 Ocean Development and International Law 127, 137–144 and R. Caddell, ‘Caught in 
the Net: Driftnet Fishing Restrictions and the European Court of Justice’ (2010) 22 Journal 
of Environmental Law 301, 301–304.
65   G.J. Hewison, ‘The Legally Binding Nature of the Moratorium on Large-Scale High Seas 
Driftnet Fishing’ (1994) 25 Journal of Maritime Law and Commerce 557, 578–580.
66   Resolution 57/141 of 12 December 2002, para 56.
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appropriate forum through which bottom fishing concerns might be directed.67 
Since 2003, the UNGA has amalgamated its previously fragmented pronounce-
ments on fisheries matters into a specific – and often hard-fought – annual 
Resolution on Sustainable Fisheries. In 2004 the protection of the seabed was 
addressed for the first time in the UNGA Sustainable Fisheries Resolution.68 
In four core paragraphs, Resolution 59/25 lamented a general lack of regula-
tory competence over particular marine ecosystems, calling upon States to 
apply the precautionary approach to prohibit ‘destructive fishing practices, 
including bottom trawling that has adverse impacts on vulnerable marine eco-
systems’, until appropriate conservation and management measures have been 
adopted.69
This represents the first – albeit undefined – use of the term ‘vulnerable 
marine ecosystem’ which has subsequently become a notable addition to the 
lexicon of global marine governance. The commitment to seek the interim 
prohibition of ‘destructive fishing practices’ on a case-by-case basis nonethe-
less fell short of the full moratorium on trawl fisheries in ABNJ that had been 
sought by activists – and had indeed been initially present in earlier drafts 
of the Resolution.70 Resolution 59/25 called upon those RFMOs with compe-
tence over bottom fisheries to ‘urgently’ adopt conservation and management 
measures in accordance with international law to address destructive fishing 
practices, those inflicting adverse impacts on VMEs and to ensure compliance 
with such measures. In particular, RFMOs that lacked these competences were 
requested to extend their pre-existing mandates to regulate bottom fisheries,71 
while the international community was urged to cooperate in the creation 
of new RFMOs for unregulated areas of the global oceans, which would be 
endowed with these powers ab initio and thereby be able to address deep-sea 
fishing as an immediate operative priority upon their inception.
In 2006, a further and arguably more influential Resolution was adopted by 
the UNGA, expressing dissatisfaction with the rate of progress since 2004 and 
calling for steps to be taken ‘immediately’ to sustainably manage deep-sea fish 
67   See further L.A. Kimball, ‘Deep-Sea Fisheries of the High Seas: The Management Impasse’ 
(2004) 19 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 259, 263–272.
68   Resolution 59/25 of 17 November 2004.
69   Para 66.
70   Y. Takei, Filling Regulatory Gaps in High Seas Fisheries: Discrete High Seas Fish Stocks, 
Deep-Sea Fisheries and Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems (Martinus Nijhoff: Leiden/Boston: 
2013) 112. The rather vague wording of the Resolution also suggests that, while politically 
prompted by the excesses of trawl fisheries, its application was not confined to such 
activities.
71   Para 68.
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stocks and VMEs.72 In a notable departure, paragraph 83 of Resolution 61/105 
listed for the first time a series of targeted action points for RFMOs to com-
plete, notably an assessment of whether individual bottom fishing activities 
have significant adverse impacts on VMEs, and to ensure that if so they are 
managed to prevent such impacts, or not authorized to proceed; to identify 
VMEs and determine whether bottom fishing activities would cause significant 
adverse impacts to such ecosystems; to close such areas to bottom fishing and 
ensure that such activities do not proceed unless conservation and manage-
ment measures have been established to prevent significant adverse impacts; 
and to require RFMOs to cease bottom fishing where VMEs are encountered.
Resolution 61/105 therefore represents a more nuanced series of restric-
tions upon bottom fisheries, whereby such commitments are triggered only 
where there is a threat of a significant adverse impact (SAI) on VMEs. The 
onus is therefore placed upon identifying locations within which VMEs are 
present and in establishing a precautionary requirement for vessels to cease 
fishing upon encountering such features, or to ensure that these areas are pre-
emptively closed to bottom fishing until it may be established that no such 
encounters are likely to result. In principle, this allows for the co-existence of 
fisheries and environmental restrictions in locations that have been identified 
as susceptible to the adverse impacts of deep-sea bottom fishing if not man-
aged proactively.
However, Resolution 61/105 also raised immediate interpretive difficulties, 
since the threshold by which a marine ecosystem may be considered ‘vulner-
able’ and an adverse impact deemed ‘significant’ – and, moreover, the precise 
circumstances under which an ‘encounter’ may be considered to have occurred 
in the first place – was not defined, hence the FAO was called upon to elaborate 
detailed practical guidance on these issues.73 As with previous pronounce-
ments, Resolution 61/105 also recommended the expedited development of 
interim measures to address locations without operational RFMO coverage.74 
In a novel departure, Resolution 61/105 also directed specific action points to 
states in areas for which no competent authority was in existence, with flag 
states requested to cease the national authorisation of fishing vessels in ABNJ 
without a competent RFMO or to unilaterally introduce measures applicable 
to nationally-registered ships to implement the broad commitments advanced 
therein.75
72   UNGA Resolution 61/105 of 8 December 2006, para 80.
73   Para 89.
74   Para 85.
75   Para 86.
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In 2008, following an extensive technical consultation process, the FAO 
adopted an influential set of international Guidelines to frame the practical 
implementation of the relevant UNGA Resolutions for fisheries exploiting 
deep-sea species ‘in a targeted or incidental manner’.76 The Guidelines have an 
express application to the high seas – although states are also encouraged to 
adopt these approaches where appropriate within their national waters – and 
are applicable to fisheries for which the total catch includes species that can 
only sustain low exploitation rates and the fishing gear used in this process 
is likely to contact the seafloor during the course of fishing operations.77 The 
overarching objectives of the Guidelines are therefore to ensure the long-term 
and sustainable use of marine living resources in the deep-sea and to prevent 
significant adverse impacts upon VMEs in the process.78 Reinforcing the earlier 
UNGA commitments, states and RFMOs are also requested to adopt and imple-
ment measures consistent with the precautionary and ecosystem approaches 
to fisheries management to identify areas in which VMEs are known or likely to 
occur and to take action using the best available information.79 Nevertheless, 
the Guidelines are expressly non-binding in nature,80 and their regulatory 
effect instead is considered to have been promoted through the due diligence 
obligation incumbent upon flag states.81
The Guidelines were swiftly endorsed in turn by the UNGA, which called 
upon states to act to secure their implementation ‘immediately, indi-
vidually and through regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements’.82 Nevertheless it was observed that the operative paragraphs of 
the previous UNGA Resolutions had ‘not been sufficiently implemented in all 
cases’.83 Accordingly, Resolution 64/72 reiterated the action points called for 
in Resolution 61/105, adding a further commitment to promote the adoption 
of conservation and management measures to ensure the long-term sustain-
ability of deep-sea stocks and associated species, particularly through setting 
76   International Guidelines for the Management of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the High Seas (FAO, 
Rome: 2008), para 5. For an extensive discussion of the formulation of the Guidelines 
and their prospective legal effect see L. Korseberg, ‘The Law-Making Effects of the FAO 
Deep-Sea Fisheries Guidelines’ (2018) 67 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
801.
77   Para 8. The total catch is defined herein as ‘everything brought up by the gear’, reinforcing 
the notion that the Guidelines ought to be applied even where deep-sea species are taken 
incidentally.
78   Para 11.
79   Para 12.
80   Abstract to the Guidelines.
81   Korseberg (n.76), 830.
82   Resolution 64/72 of 4 December 2009, para 113.
83   Para 118.
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appropriate levels for fishing effort, capacity and catch limits.84 This was rein-
forced in 2011, wherein the UNGA observed that ‘despite the progress made, the 
urgent actions called for in the relevant paragraphs of resolutions 61/105 and 
64/72 have not been fully implemented in all cases’.85 In a notable departure to 
the previous instruments, Resolution 66/68 further called for the strengthen-
ing of assessment procedures so as ‘to take into account individual, collective 
and cumulative impacts, and for making the assessments publicly available, 
recognizing that doing so can support transparency and capacity-building 
globally’.86
Since 2011, these commitments have been regularly affirmed and endorsed, 
most notably in 2016, where the UNGA called upon states and RFMOs to use 
the full set of criteria in the FAO Guidelines to identify VMEs and to assess 
SAIs, to ensure that impact assessments are reviewed periodically and updated 
where there is a ‘substantial change in the fishery’ or where there is relevant 
new information and that conservation and management measures are based 
upon best available science, especially with regard to improving the effective 
implementation of thresholds and move-on rules.87
3 Bottom Fisheries and Benthic Ecosystems: Assessing the Impact of 
the UNGA VME Commitments
Thus far, eight bodies have established competence over bottom fishing 
of deep-sea stocks, each of which has adopted a series of measures for the 
regulation of these fisheries. These are the North-East Atlantic Fisheries 
Commission (NEAFC), the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), 
the Southeast Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (SEAFO), the Southern Indian 
Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA), the North Pacific Fisheries Commission 
(NPFC), the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean (GFCM), the 
South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) and 
the Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Marine Living Resources 
(CCAMLR). This cohort is also complemented by the European Union (EU), 
which has also developed standards for bottom fishing in respect of its Member 
States fishing in ABNJ.
Despite an expanding degree of regulation for deep-sea bottom fisheries in 
ABNJ, the work of these bodies rather defies neat comparative analysis. Each 
84   Para 119(d).
85   Resolution 66/68 of 6 December 2011, para 129.
86   Para 129(a).
87   Resolution 71/123 of 13 February 2017, para 180.
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RFMO presides over a unique set of ecological conditions (and thereby dif-
fering volumes of VMEs to manage), different fishing industries and varying 
political, material and financial resources and priorities. Accordingly, the fol-
lowing section examines progress towards three key cumulative requirements 
of the various UNGA Resolutions, namely the need to identify VMEs and to 
regulate encounters, the establishment of fishing footprints and the elabora-
tion of area closures, and the rectification of problematic governance gaps in 
respect of bottom fisheries and sensitive seabed ecosystems.
3.1 VMEs Designations and Encounter Management
The primary commitment established across the various UNGA Resolutions 
is the need to identify VMEs and to institute appropriate precautionary man-
agement measures in order to protect such areas from significant adverse 
impacts of bottom fishing. As noted above, these commitments have been 
given practical voice through the FAO’s Deep-sea Fisheries Guidelines. A pri-
mary stage in protecting an individual seabed site is therefore to identify it as 
‘vulnerable’, a notion considered by the Guidelines to be
related to the likelihood that a population, community, or habitat will 
experience substantial alteration from short-term or chronic distur-
bance, and the likelihood that it would recover and in what time frame … 
The most vulnerable ecosystems are those that are both easily disturbed 
and very slow to recover, or may never recover.88
Accordingly, the Guidelines acknowledge that this is itself a variable concept. 
Features that are ‘physically fragile or inherently rare’ may be vulnerable to 
most impacts, while locations may be more resilient and therefore not nec-
essarily ‘vulnerable’ in particular contexts.89 At the heart of this distinction 
appears to lie an inherent tension between advocates of blanket preserva-
tion, and those states with a vested socio-economic interest in bottom fishing. 
Indeed, as Korseberg observes, there was a relatively limited attendance at the 
FAO’s Technical Consultation in 2008 at which the Guidelines were adopted, 
but those states that did attend were prominent fishing nations.90 A number of 
states have also strenuously observed that bottom fishing does not necessarily 
result in catastrophic benthic damage, especially in largely featureless areas 
of the global seabed, and (perhaps less convincingly in the ABNJ context) that 
88   Para 14.
89   Para 15.
90   Korseberg (n.76), 824.
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such fisheries continue represent a significant source of global food security.91 
In this regard, fishing states have largely managed to stave off the threat of 
blanket closures: the Guidelines expressly provide that the risks to a marine 
ecosystem are to be measured ‘by its vulnerability, the probability of a threat 
occurring and the mitigation means applied to the threat’.92
The Guidelines also elaborate a series of representative characteristics 
that should be used as criteria in identifying VMEs, namely the uniqueness or 
rarity of an area or ecosystem; the functional significance of the habitat; the 
fragility of the area; the life history traits of component species that would 
make recovery difficult (as exhibited in many species of deep-sea fish); and the 
structural complexity of an ecosystem.93 Although a further, non-exhaustive, 
series of examples are listed in an Annex to the Guidelines, the individual 
geological conditions of each region mean that the ultimate decision as to 
whether a particular site or ecosystem constitutes a VME is made by the RFMO 
in question. The practice of RFMOs has thus been to develop extensive indi-
vidual lists of indicator species and ecosystems in order to assess its unique 
regulatory priorities.
In this respect, there has been a strong emphasis upon sharing examples 
of best practice between RFMOs, as mandated both by successive UNGA 
Resolutions and the Guidelines themselves.94 This was initially problematic, 
leading to complaints that support tools were initially limited95 and that there 
were few opportunities for institutional learning between RFMOs.96 With 
91   Impacts of fishing on vulnerable marine ecosystems: Actions taken by States and regional 
fisheries management organizations and arrangements to give effect to paragraphs 66 to 
69 of General Assembly resolution 59/25 on sustainable fisheries, regarding the impacts of 
fishing on vulnerable marine ecosystems. Report of the Secretary-General; UN Document 
A/61/154, para 59.
92   Para 16.
93   Para 42.
94   Guidelines, para 29.
95   Actions taken by States and regional fisheries management organizations and arrange-
ments to give effect to paragraphs 83 to 90 of General Assembly resolution 61/105 on sus-
tainable fisheries, including through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the 
Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relat-
ing to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks, and related instruments: Report of the Secretary-General; UN Document 
A/64/305, para 202.
96   Actions taken by States and regional fisheries management organizations and arrange-
ments in response to paragraphs 80 and 83 to 87 of General Assembly resolution 61/105 
and paragraphs 113 to 117 and 119 to 127 of General Assembly resolution 64/72 on sustain-
able fisheries, addressing the impacts of bottom fishing on vulnerable marine ecosystems 
and the long-term sustainability of deep-sea fish stocks: Report of the Secretary-General; UN 
Document A/66/307, para 207.
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regard to the former concern, considerable progress has been made by the FAO 
in developing a distinct VME database, which has consolidated a map of areas 
that are both restricted and open for fishing, as well as maintaining a central 
repository of information concerning indicator lists for VMEs by individual 
RFMOs.97 Attempts to improve coordination between the various RFMOs with 
competences over the deep-sea environment have, however, proved arguably 
less productive. Notwithstanding some initial optimism that these RFMOs 
could develop collaborative practices akin to the Kobe process of Cooperation 
to streamline regulatory and administrative activities on issues of common 
concern, which has proved to be of significant utility to streamlining the work 
of tuna RFMOs,98 only one such meeting has been convened to date.99
Where VMEs have been identified, the Guidelines also outline the circum-
stances under which a SAI may be deemed to have occurred. Such an encounter 
involves ecosystem integrity being compromised in a manner that ‘(i) impairs 
the ability of affected populations to replace themselves; (ii) degrades the 
long-term natural productivity of habitats; or (iii) causes, on more than a tem-
porary basis, significant loss of species richness, habitat or community types. 
Impacts should be evaluated individually, in combination and cumulatively’.100 
The risk of a significant adverse impact therefore triggers further mitigation 
strategies, primarily in the form of the ‘move-on’ rule that requires a vessel to 
retreat to a particular distance away from the VME in question. To this end, a 
number of RFMOs have developed encounter protocols, which are predomi-
nantly based upon the incidental catch of indicator species above threshold 
levels.101
Nevertheless, concerns have been raised that the thresholds established by 
a number of RFMOs are contingent upon a certain volume of live by-catch. 
This, for instance, has been the approach of NAFO, NEAFC and SEAFO, yet it 
is considered a poor tool to identify an encounter since the equipment used is 
designed exclusively to catch fish and is therefore not conducive to the effec-
tive sampling of benthic areas.102 Similarly, given that cold-water reefs (which 
represent a substantial proportion of current VMEs) habitually comprise a 
97   For the most recent consolidated version, see http://www.fao.org/in-action/
vulnerable-marine-ecosystems/vme-indicators/en/.
98   See J. Harrison, ‘Key Challenges Relating to the Governance of Regional Fisheries’ in 
R. Caddell and E.J. Molenaar (eds), Strengthening International Fisheries Law in an Era of 
Changing Oceans (Hart: Oxford, 2019) 79, 99.
99   Record of the Meeting of the Deep-Sea Secretariats Contact Group, June 2016, 4.
100   Para 16.
101   See for example, SEAFO CM 30/5 and CCAMLR CM 22–07.
102   P.J. Auster et al., ‘Definition and Detection of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems on the High 
Seas: Problems with the “Move-On” Rule’ (2011) 68 ICES Journal of Marine Science 254, 258.
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framework of primarily dead coral, significant damage may be legitimately 
inflicted upon a VME without triggering the ‘move-on rule’.103 There is also a 
risk that evidence of an encounter may be lost during the retrieval of a net, 
hence otherwise responsible fishers may be oblivious to an impact, while a 
longstanding objection to ‘move-on’ approaches remains the tacit toleration of 
a documented degree of environmental harm incumbent in the process.
Ultimately, definitively establishing the existence of a VME or whether a SAI 
has occurred is a complex task, and one that will be subject to constant revi-
sion in the light of on-going data-collection requirements. This is especially 
true given the very limited baseline knowledge of remote seabed areas. The 
capacity of parties to RFMOs to constantly monitor such ecosystems – even 
within the areas in which significant research activities have been conducted, 
let alone those that are currently unfished and largely unexplored – is highly 
variable, while assessing whether such areas might be sufficiently resilient 
to prospectively support a degree of fishing is also an exceptionally difficult 
undertaking. Consequently, while the Guidelines have provided a pathway 
through which prospective VMEs may be identified and made subject to 
avoidance techniques, calls for institutional restraint are prevalent and there 
remains a vocal constituency of advocates for a moratorium on bottom fishing, 
especially in ABNJ.104
3.2 Fishing Footprints and Protected Areas
Once VMEs have been identified and appropriate encounter protocols and 
mitigation strategies have been advanced by RFMOs, a further commitment 
established within the multiple UNGA Resolutions is to prevent fishing activi-
ties where they may have a SAI upon such sites. In this respect, RFMOs can be 
seen to have advanced two core strategies towards addressing the impacts of 
fishing in the areas under their jurisdiction. In the first instance, participants 
have been required to identify their existing fishing footprints – i.e. those loca-
tions in which some fishing activity has previously been conducted – wherein 
fishing is intended to be focused for the foreseeable future. In this manner, the 
unfished area is to be largely left alone, unless a participant wishes to expand 
its footprint by initiating an exploratory fishery. If so, any such endeavours are 
to be subject to prior approval and conducted under strict controls. The second 
response is the institution of a more traditional area closure, in which fishing is 
prohibited in order to protect VMEs.
103   UN Document A/66/307 (n.96), para 46.
104   Norse (n.4), 317.
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Since the adoption of the UNGA Resolutions, RFMOs have engaged in a 
process of mapping the current extent of fished areas with their jurisdictional 
purviews. In this manner, one key policy has been to seek to confine fisher-
ies within their current locations, while managing VMEs within these areas 
through encounter protocols and, if necessary, fisheries closures. Within the 
residue of these unfished areas, bottom fishing is prima facie constrained, 
although parties may apply to extend their fishing footprints and establish 
spatially and temporally restricted exploratory fisheries in these locations. 
Exploratory fisheries are fundamentally different to commercial fisheries and 
are primarily characterised by an emphasis on low-effort fishing, stringent 
observer coverage, extensive data-collection commitments and a requirement 
that activities may not proceed without the express prior approval of the man-
agement body.
The process is exemplified by the practice of NEAFC, which in 2008 adopted 
an Interim Exploratory Bottom Fishing Protocol for New Bottom Fishing Areas.105 
Under these arrangements NEAFC, in consultation with the International 
Council on Exploration of the Sea (ICES), maintains a full itinerary of such 
areas in an Annex to the Recommendation which establishes a definitive, yet 
adjustable, list of existing fishing footprints. These footprints can be extended, 
but any activities conducted therein remain classed as ‘exploratory’ and subject 
to prior approval, based on the submission of a Notice of Intent to fish, along-
side a harvesting plan, mitigation plan and a ‘sufficient system’ to record data.106 
Similar systems have been established by SEAFO,107 the NFPC,108 SPRFMO,109 
and, especially, CCAMLR,110 on whose pioneering system of exploratory fisher-
ies such procedures have been largely modelled.111
A more traditional policy response to the problem of the degradation of 
particular seabed ecosystems on the part of RFMOs has been the designation 
of restricted areas for bottom fishing, or the outright prohibition of this equip-
ment. In this respect, significant area closures have been instituted by NEAFC, 
105   Recommendation XVI:2008.
106   Articles 6 and 7 of Recommendation 9:2015; see Consolidated Text of all NEAFC 
Recommendations on Regulating Bottom Fishing, available on-line at www.neafc.org.
107   CM 30/15.
108   CMM 2016–05: Bottom Fisheries and Protection of Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in 
the Northeast Pacific Ocean and CMM 2016–06: Bottom Fisheries and Protection of 
Vulnerable Marine Ecosystems in the North-western Pacific Ocean.
109   CMM 03–2014 (Management of Bottom Fishing in the SPRFMO Convention Area).
110   CM 22–06: Bottom Fishing in the Convention Area.
111   See further R. Caddell, ‘Precautionary Management and the Development of Future 
Fishing Opportunities: The International Regulation of New and Exploratory Fisheries 
(2018) 33 International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 199, 212–234.
Richard Caddell - 9789004391567
Downloaded from Brill.com02/05/2020 07:10:47PM
via free access
276 Caddell
NAFO, SEAFO and CCAMLR.112 Moreover, the GFCM has established three sepa-
rate Fisheries Restricted Areas (FRAs) for a more modest volume of territory. 
Most emphatically, bottom trawling has been prohibited by the GFCM in any 
area below 1000 metres,113 while CCAMLR has banned the use of all commercial 
bottom trawling in the high seas areas under its purview.114 Nevertheless, con-
cerns have been raised that mid-water trawling, where nets are piloted through 
the water column as opposed to being dragged across the seabed, retains con-
siderable scope to damage fragile submarine features, especially seamounts. 
One notable regulatory departure in this regard is the approach adopted by 
SPRFMO, which has defined bottom-trawling as including mid-water trawling 
on seamounts, given the propensity for contact with seabed features even at 
this comparatively more elevated depth.115 This remains a minority view, how-
ever, although similar policies were considered by NAFO in 2015, which failed 
to find consensus on the issue but instead imposed particular restrictions on 
the design and deployment of mid-water trawl gear.116
Beyond the closures initiated under the auspices of RFMOs, an intriguing 
recent development has been the elaboration of a new sub-species of area clo-
sure led by the fishing industry itself. Such closures have been most closely 
associated on an international level within the Southern Indian Ocean, while 
on a national level, extensive seabed areas have also been closed to dredging 
and bottom trawling within the EEZ of New Zealand. In the context of the 
Indian Ocean, SIOFA entered into effect in June 2012, although early meet-
ings failed to engender confidence that this new organisation would be able to 
address VMEs swiftly and effectively. Despite a strong recognition of the need 
to implement the UNGA VME commitments, the parties were unable to agree 
on substantive conservation and management measures to address bottom 
fisheries and instead came to the bland agreement that individual participants 
should ‘endeavour’ to limit deep-sea trawling.117 Prior to the inauguration of 
SIOFA, in 2006 the main deep-sea fishing operators established the Southern 
112   For a full inventory, see http://www.fao.org/in-action/vulnerable-marine-ecosystems/
vme-indicators/en/.
113   REC29/2005/1.
114   CM 22-05: Restrictions on the use of bottom trawling gear in high-seas areas of the 
Convention Area. Under this provision, bottom trawling could prospectively be deployed 
for scientific purposes.
115   Report of the Second Scientific Committee Meeting, at p. 15.
116   D Diz, ‘The Seamounts of the Sargasso Sea: Adequately Protected?’ (2016) 31(2) 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 359, 366–67.
117   G. Wright et al., ‘Advancing Marine Biodiversity Protection through Regional Fisheries 
Management: A Review of Bottom Fisheries Closures in Areas Beyond National 
Jurisdiction’ (2015) 61 Marine Policy 134, 144.
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Indian Ocean Deepsea Fishers Association (SIODFA) and voluntarily des-
ignated eleven individual sites as Benthic Protected Areas, albeit with some 
criticism that these locations were arguably too deep for a viable commercial 
fishery.118 Additional sites within more orthodox fishing grounds were desig-
nated as Benthic Protected Areas in 2013. Although these sites remain voluntary 
in nature – and as an industry initiative they do not carry the prohibitive value 
of RFMO authority – they have nevertheless had considerable traction within 
the region, since the benefits of membership of SIODFA are contingent upon 
compliance with these measures, while individual states have also made this a 
formal condition for vessel licensing,119 suggesting that commercial incentives 
can be at least as effective as the traditional command-and-control approach 
adopted by RFMOs.
Similarly, on a national level, an extensive series of Benthic Protection 
Areas covering over 1.1 million km² was designated throughout the EEZ of New 
Zealand in 2007 in which trawling and dredging is precluded, a measure that 
was also, to the surprise of many domestic commentators, proposed by the 
national fishing industry.120 In a manner reminiscent of the designation of 
fishing footprints collated by RFMOs, these sites are currently located in areas 
in which no fishing activities occur, with their prospective value considered to 
be in curtailing the future expansion of trawling. This approach has also been 
adopted in neighbouring Australia, were approximately 58% of the national 
EEZ is also closed to bottom trawling – albeit encompassing significant 
locations in which no trawling occurs.121 Nevertheless, in New Zealand the pro-
ponents of these measures were not entirely motivated by ecological altruism 
and the initial proposal came with heavy strings attached, with the Deepwater 
Group seeking an indefinite moratorium on future fisheries closures in the 
national EEZ.122 Eventually, this quid pro quo was restricted to an agreement 
not to create further marine protected areas until 2013.123 Moreover, the sites 
are confined to the seabed itself, with mid-water trawls permitted in the water 
118   Ibid. (noting however that this could be a useful designation if fishing activities seek to 
move deeper in future years).
119   G. Wright and J. Rochette, ‘Regional Management of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction 
in the Western Indian Ocean: State of Play and Possible Ways Forward’ (2017) 32 
International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 765, 777–778.
120   J. Helson et al., ‘Private Rights, Public Benefits: Industry-Driven Seabed Protection’ (2010) 
34 Marine Policy 557, 559–563.
121   T.K. Mazor et al., ‘Trawl Exposure and Protection of Seabed Fauna at Large Spatial Scales’ 
(2017) 23 Diversity and Distributions 1280, 1280.
122   Helson (n120), 560.
123   T.D. Eddy, ‘On the Need for Meaningful Marine Protected Area (MPA) Standards’ (2013) 23 
Aquatic Conservation: Marine and Freshwater Ecosystems 481, 482.
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column, although considerable monitoring restrictions were placed upon any 
fishing activities taking place in these areas.124 Critics of this approach have 
argued that these areas are not true MPAs as they merely restrain specific activ-
ities yet leave open the possibility of further industrial activities in superjacent 
waters.125 Indeed, the national authorities have long been accused of using 
these designations as a means of inflating the volume of national MPA cov-
erage, culminating in a rather contrite declaration in April 2019 that Benthic 
Protection Areas would no longer be counted within the domestic inventory 
of MPAs.126
A further issue of considerable significance in seeking to ensure that holis-
tic protection is applied to sensitive seabed ecosystems is the extent to which 
fisheries closures are able to dovetail effectively with the management policies 
of other sectoral regulators. As noted above, seabed features are best protected 
where both the bethos and the overlaying water column are subject to com-
plementary conservation measures. One striking example of this approach 
is the pioneering arrangements between NEAFC and OSPAR, whose respec-
tive jurisdictional areas intersect within the north-east Atlantic region. The 
legal mandate of NEAFC is confined to fisheries management, while OSPAR’s 
competence to address “non-polluting human activities” strictly excludes any 
consideration of fisheries.127 In discharging this mandate, OSPAR has placed 
considerable emphasis upon establishing a network of MPAs and has a com-
paratively lengthy history of promoting interactions with other organisations 
in this capacity.128
In 2008, a MOU was concluded between NEAFC and OSPAR129 to explore 
areas of mutual interest and formalise a basis for potential future collabora-
tion, for which the most significant outcome was the adoption in 2014 of a 
Collective Arrangement on cooperation on MPAs in ABNJ. In 2009, NEAFC 
had closed a series of areas to bottom fishing that broadly corresponded to 
the designations within the OSPAR MPA network, notably within the Charlie 
124   Helson (n.120) 564.
125   T.D. Eddy, ‘One Hundred-Fold Difference between Perceived and Actual Levels of Marine 
Protection in New Zealand’ (2014) 46 Marine Policy 61, 64–66.
126   ‘Conservationists Win Battle Over Government’s “Fishing Whoppers”’ https://www 
.stuff.co.nz/national/politics/111766497/conservationists-win-battle-over-govern 
ments-fishing-whoppers.
127   Article 4 of Annex V to the OSPAR Convention, added in 1998.
128   See further E.J. Molenaar and A.G. Oude Elferink, ‘Marine Protected Areas in Areas 
beyond National Jurisdiction: The Pioneering Efforts under the OSPAR Convention’ 
(2009) 5 Utrecht Law Review 5, 16.
129   Reproduced on-line at http://www.ospar.org/about/international-cooperation/memo 
randa-of-understanding.
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Gibbs and Mid-Atlantic Ridge MPAs. The Collaborative Arrangement there-
fore addresses specific locations of mutual interest within the region, which 
are outlined in Annex I and are jointly maintained by both organisations. 
While not exclusively focused on area-based management – promising lines of 
cooperation have also emerged for marine litter and shark conservation – the 
Collaborative Arrangement provides a platform for data exchange and updates 
on amendments to the respective restricted areas, with annual meetings hav-
ing been convened since 2015 to promote these objectives further.
The OSPAR/NEAFC arrangements illustrate both the opportunities 
and the complexities facing purported collaborative exchanges of this nature. 
The Collaborative Arrangement seeks to include other pertinent global and 
regional actors to minimise potential interference with Annex I areas.130 OSPAR 
and NEAFC have thus encouraged the International Maritime Organisation 
(IMO) and International Seabed Authority (ISA) – which both have the capac-
ity to advance sectoral management tools – to participate in this process, albeit 
with little success. As with many synergistic endeavours between multilateral 
bodies, incompatible meeting schedules have inhibited interactions with the 
IMO.131 More significantly, however, such initiatives have met with internal 
resistance from IMO participants that are geographically and economically 
removed from shipping activities in the region opposed to devoting time and 
resources on matters of more localised concern.132 Meanwhile, the ISA has con-
sidered its participation to be ‘premature’ in the absence of a clearly defined 
project-based role in the region.133 Wariness about open-ended collaborative 
demands has also been expressed internally within the OSPAR Commission, 
with some participants concerned that cross-sectoral management represents 
a significant but small aspect of an extensive portfolio of activities that could 
impede the pursuit of more immediate regulatory priorities.134
130   The International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) is also 
identified as a potential partner, given its application to tuna fisheries in the region. 
Similarly, OSPAR has developed a rather more concise MOU with the North Atlantic 
Salmon Conservation Organisation (NASCO), although it is more ambiguous and pre-
scribes few action points.
131   Aide Memoire and Key Actions Resulting from the First Meeting under the Collective 
Agreement, para 2.7.
132   Aide Memoire and Key Actions Resulting from the Second Meeting under the Collective 
Agreement, para 3.6.
133   Ibid.
134   D. Freestone et al., ‘Can Existing Institutions Protect Biodiversity in Areas beyond National 
Jurisdiction? Experiences from Two On-Going Processes’ (2014) 49 Marine Policy 167, 173.
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3.3 Governance Gaps
A further issue of strong concern within the various UNGA Resolutions has 
been the need to close the significant governance gaps that were exposed by 
initial attempts to regulate deep-sea fisheries. As observed above, bottom fish-
eries have long been deceptively under-regulated on an international basis. 
Many RFMO apply only to single species, while until relatively recently large 
swathes of the global oceans were not subject to any management coverage. 
Moreover, as observed above, those RFMOs that did technically exercise a 
mandate over deep-sea stocks generally lacked the legal competence to fully 
protect seabed ecosystems. In this respect, closing gaps in regulatory coverage 
has been an important, and largely successful, element of the commitments 
established under the UNGA Resolution.
Since the turn of the current century, a suite of new RFMOs – notably SIOFA, 
SEAFO, SPRFMO and the NPFC – have been inaugurated and have expressly 
established the protection of VMEs as a central tenet of the mandates of their 
constituent bodies. This is most clearly illustrated by the NPFC, for which the 
preamble to its constituent treaty expressly references the relevant UNGA 
Resolutions, while the prevention of significant adverse impacts from fisher-
ies upon VMEs is established as a ‘general principle’ for this body.135 Similarly, 
consideration of VMEs is established as a specific aspect of the mandate of 
the scientific fora of SPRFMO.136 More significantly, perhaps, the conclusion of 
these instruments was preceded by a series of interim arrangements focused 
on the regulation of bottom fishing in these areas.
Allied to this, more longstanding RFMOs have been prepared to interpret 
their mandates – and, indeed, reformulate their constituent provisions – in 
a broad manner so as to establish a clear degree of management control over 
bottom fisheries. This is exemplified by the practice of NEAFC, which closed 
three deep-sea sites to bottom trawling and fishing with static gear, includ-
ing gillnets and bottom longlines effective from 2005 onwards.137 This was a 
very far-sighted development at the material time, preceding the seminal 
UNGA Resolution 59/25 by some months, with NEAFC therefore operating 
in uncharted waters with no global guidance in place. Moreover, it might be 
questioned whether stricto sensu NEAFC possessed the requisite regulatory 
135   Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fisheries Resources in the 
North Pacific Ocean (Seoul, 1 April 2012, in force 19 July 2015); preamble and Article 3(e).
136   Convention on the Conservation and Management of High Seas Fishery Resources in the 
South Pacific Ocean (Auckland, 14 November 2009, in force 24 August 2012) [2012] ATS 28; 
Article 11.
137   Recommendation 05–2005: Recommendation for the Protection of Vulnerable 
Deep-Water Habitats.
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competence to do so, which necessitated a very broad interpretation of the 
Commission’s powers on the part of its constituent Members in approving 
these closures.138
More fundamentally, older structures have undertaken a process of con-
siderable reform in recent years to allow them to more centrally address the 
environmental issues associated with deep-sea fisheries. In this respect, a 
series of provisions have been ‘retro-fitted’ into the NAFO Convention, through 
extensive textual revisions adopted in 2007 in order to promote an ecosystem 
approach to fisheries management, which eventually entered into effect on 
18 May 2017.139 Notwithstanding the recent formalisation of these arrange-
ments, many of these obligations had been applied provisionally throughout 
this interim period,140 which enabled NAFO to adopt a series of measures to 
promote the protection of VMEs. A similar approach has been adopted by the 
International Commission on the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT), 
again largely motivated to advance additional protection for VMEs as pro-
moted through the relevant UNGA commitments.141
A further important factor has been the role of flag states, which had also 
been requested to take action to ensure that their vessels fish in a manner that 
is sympathetic to the benthic environment. In this respect, particular states 
and entities have been prepared to adopt unilateral standards where their 
vessels operate in areas lacking RFMO coverage. A particular example is the 
South-West Atlantic, whereby political complications have precluded the likely 
establishment of a RFMO for these waters for the foreseeable future. A volume 
of deep-sea fishing has been conducted in the region, predominantly by Spain, 
for which a series of voluntary closures have been instituted. More broadly, 
in 2008, in seeking to implement the pertinent UNGA Resolutions, the EU 
adopted a Regulation specifically addressing the actions of its Member States 
in ABNJ for which no RFMO has been established or interim measures have 
not yet been agreed for the protection of VMEs.142 Under this provision, such 
138   Molenaar (n.30), 538–39.
139   Convention on Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic fisheries (Ottawa, 24 October 1978, 
in force 1 January 1979) 1135 UNTS 369 (Article I(h)). The consolidated version of this 
instrument, incorporating the 2017 amendments, is available on-line at https://www.nafo 
.int/Portals/0/PDFs/key-publications/NAFOConvention-2017.pdf.
140   Resolution 1/08 of 26 September 2008 on the Interpretation and Implementation of the 
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries.
141   See further Z. Scanlon, ‘The Art of “Not Undermining”: Possibilities within Existing 
Architecture to Improve Environmental Protections in Areas beyond National Jurisdiction’ 
(2018) 75 ICES Journal of Marine Science 405–416, 410.
142   Council Regulation (EC) No 735/2008 of 15 July 2008 on the protection of vulnerable 
marine ecosystems in the high seas from the adverse impacts of bottom fishing gears 
[2008] Official Journal L201/8.
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activities may only be conducted pursuant to a special permit143 and the use 
of bottom gear is prohibited in areas ‘where no proper scientific assessment 
has been carried out and made available’.144 A permit may only be issued upon 
submission of a detailed fishing plan involving an assessment of the potential 
impacts of fishing in the area,145 for which any breach is considered a ‘serious 
infringement’ of the Common Fisheries Policy.146 In response, Spain has thus 
far closed nine separate areas to deep-sea bottom fishing by its vessels. In 2017, 
a further Regulation entered into force banning deep-sea fishing by EU vessels 
in the North-east Atlantic at depths of 800 metres,147 although the unilateral 
policies introduced by the EU for this region has generated some disquiet that 
such measures might exercise an undue influence over the future trajectory of 
the regulation of VMEs within NEAFC.148
4 Conclusions
While little appreciated in the popular perception of risks to the benthic 
environment, bottom fisheries have quietly emerged as the most pressing cur-
rent threat to seabed ecosystems. Although trawl fisheries have constituted a 
source of regulatory discontent for over six hundred years, meaningful stan-
dards to address the increasingly insidious impacts of such activities on the 
global seabed have only systematically emerged over the course of the pres-
ent century. Bottom fisheries have proved to be an ecologically expensive food 
source, inflicting damage with a multi-decadal recovery timescale, while also 
decimating stocks of deep-sea fish that have often proved manifestly ill-suited 
to the scale and impact of commercial fishing. Such activities have also, for the 
most part, been conducted in an effective regulatory vacuum, with deep-sea 
fisheries representing not only a particularly striking example of the ‘tragedy 
143   Article 1(1).
144   Article 6(1).
145   Article 3.
146   Article 10.
147   Regulation (EU) No. 2016/2336 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
14 December 2016 establishing specific conditions for fishing for deep-sea stocks in the 
north-east Atlantic and provisions for fishing in international waters of the north-east 
Atlantic and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 2347/2002 [2016] Official Journal 
354/1; On the development of this provision see further G.A. Oanta, ‘The European 
Union’s Reform of Deep-Sea Fisheries in the North East Atlantic’ (2017) 32 International 
Journal of Marine and Coastal Law 589.
148   G.A. Oanta, ‘International Organisations and Deep-Sea Fisheries: Current Status and 
Future Prospects’ (2018) 87 Marine Policy 51, 57.
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of the commons’, but also serving as a stark metaphor for the failure of inter-
national legal frameworks to respond effectively to the challenges of depleted 
fisheries and damaged oceanic ecosystems.149
The response to the challenges presented by deep-sea bottom fishing repre-
sents an intriguing case study of the development of regulatory standards for 
the seabed. In this respect, conservation and management policies have been 
largely driven through the UNGA, which has in turn designated RFMOs as the 
primary vehicles through which this problem is to be addressed. Consequently, 
since 2004 a growing suite of commitments has quietly emerged, which have 
been implemented by a variety of actors over the past decade. To this end, a 
series of positive outcomes have been achieved. Governance gaps have been 
noticeably closed, with new RFMOs having emerged in recent years, many of 
which feature a specific and unprecedented commitment towards protecting 
VMEs. Other structures have used the regulatory impetus provided by the UNGA 
to undertake significant reforms, placing ecosystem considerations more cen-
trally within their revised mandates. Where regulatory lacunae persist, flag 
states have demonstrated a willingness to step into the breach and promote 
standards that are rapidly becoming recognised as universal examples of best 
practice towards threatened seabed environments.
Nevertheless, particular challenges remain and, despite this laudable prog-
ress, the commitments elaborated by the relevant UNGA Resolutions have 
still not been fully realised. Notwithstanding the value of the FAO Guidelines, 
bottom fisheries may still legitimately wreak considerable damage to the sea-
bed before environmental obligations are engaged. The relevant instruments 
remain replete with opaque trigger-points for action, the identification of 
VMEs on a global basis is very much a work in progress and the ‘move-on’ rule 
remains a blunt instrument for addressing seabed conservation. Meanwhile 
the knowledge base concerning seabed ecology – both within, but espe-
cially outside – current areas of fishing activity remains extremely patchy. 
Considerable efforts have been made to elaborate area-based management 
tools, although a strong emphasis has been placed on developing closures in 
locations in which fishing does not occur and is unlikely to advance for many 
years. Regulatory innovations have emerged, particularly those led by industry, 
although in key instances a primary motivation has been to stave off stron-
ger protective standards. Similarly, despite some notable successes in the 
North Atlantic region, it has proved difficult to align area-based management 
149   K.M. Gjerde, ‘High Seas Fisheries Management under the Convention on the Law of the 
Sea’ in D. Freestone, R. Barnes and D. Ong (eds), The Law of the Sea: Progress and Prospects 
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2006) 281, 295.
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tools so as to provide holistic protection to the seabed from multiple sources 
of anthropogenic activity. With the prevailing legal framework having point-
edly bifurcated the regulation of the seabed and that of the water column, 
the experience of deep-sea bottom fisheries reinforces the need for joined-up 
management of benthic locations and the superjacent water column in a man-
ner that has proceeded to a regrettably limited degree to date.
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